Introduction

Ⅰ
This short paper investigates that an environmental policy could play a source of an exogenous background risk in an agentʹs decision making problem. This implies that a change in environmental condition by a policy would affect his or her seemingly irrelevant economic decision making under risk.
As an illustration, suppose a person who wants to decide how much he or she invests to a risky asset. Furthermore, suppose that he or she has a house which consists of his or her initial wealth. Assume that the price of the house is certain and stable at the moment. Thus, when he or she makes his or her financial decision, the price of the house is already incorporated into his or her initial endowment for the financial decision. Now suppose that the price of the house is not certain but risky with a known probability distribution by an environmental or development policy. Assume that the expected price of the house is equal to the original certain price, which means that the risk is a mean preserving spread. The mere fact that it is risky would affect his or her financial decision making via the generated riskiness of his or her initial endowment only if his or her preference is not risk neutral.
In fact, many environmental conditions and policies are a source of risk in the initial wealth for an economic decision making. A health risk induced by a change in environmental condition is a clear example of it. In the case that the decrease of wealth by the health damage trades off with an increase of wealth by the other factor, the wealth could be under a mean-preserving risk. A national development project usually generates both the possibility of a direct wealth increase or decrease for people who live in the corresponding region. However, the possible environmental damage by the project would lead to a potential decrease of the wealth. Thus, such a development project which would affect environment could be a source of risk at a person's initial wealth. In many cases, an environmental policy brings a clear and certain effect on an individual's wealth. For example, a greenbelt policy would decrease the wealth of the individuals who has real estates at the area.
In this paper, we present a simple model illustrating that the riskiness in an environmental good or condition could affect a personʹs general economic decision making under risk if he or she is risk averse. 1) More specifically, we present a simple model where a generated riskiness in an environmental condition (or good) makes a risk-averse person behave more risk aversely in his or her exogenous decision making (e.g., a financial decision making) under risk. In the course, we also analyze the effect of the change of wealth on his or her exogenous decision making under risk.
Though our results would be specific to the particular decision situation of our model, it is important in that the riskiness of environmental condition could potentially affect a personʹs economic decisions making under risk (e.g., portfolio buildings, investment-saving decisions, reservation wage decision) which are seemingly irrelevant to the environmental policy. Moreover, the decision situations which our model covers would include some important one such as the decision of one's reservation wage or reservation price. Thus, our result would imply that a policy related to a particular environmental condition may not only affect to it but also to a general circumstance of various economic decision making only if the environmental condition affects an individual's initial wealth.
For this purpose, we extend and generalize the results of Lee (2008) using a relaxed assumption. While there are some theoretical studies on the effect of the background risk, the general results are not unambiguous and depend on the model (Pratt and Zeckhauser (1987) , Kimball (1993) , Eeckhoudt et al. (1996) , Gollier and Pratt (1996) , McGuire et al. (1991) ). While our intuition suggests that a risk averse person would always behave more risk aversely when a background risk at initial wealth exists, the theoretical studies show that such intuition is not always true. For instance, Gollier and Pratt (1996) show that a risk averse person can increase the 1) Of course, this can be applied to a risk loving person. However, it is widely known that most people are risk averse. Thus, we focus on a risk averse person's behaviour. The model
Ⅱ
We follow a simple chance improving model (Lee (2008) ) for the analysis. This is a very simple decision making model under risk. A person faces a situation where he or she needs to give-up among potential outcomes in order to increase the winning probability. Here, the winning probability increases with the giving-up amount. For example, a job searcher's chance to get a job would increase if he reduces his or her reservation wage.
Our concern in this paper is to investigate how a person behaves in the simple chance improving situation if there is a change of environmental condition which affects his or her initial wealth. For the purpose, it is important to incorporate environmental endowment into the initial wealth and to rationalize it. In general, wealth can be defined by the sum of income and assets as follows:
Here we assume that a person has no risky asset at the moment, and the income Y is also certain. We crucially assume that the certain assets can be divided according to whether it is affected by an environmental condition or not: a 0 is not affected but a 1 is affected. For example, we could regard a 0 as cash in hand and a 1 as the price of the house in which he or she lives. In general, the price of the house is affected by the environmental conditions surrounding it. So, if there is no risk in the environmental conditions, then we could assume that his or her environmental endowment has no risk and hence the asset a 1 does not have a risk, too. Now, assume that the environmental conditions become risky and hence a 1 also becomes risky in the mean preserving spread way. Then, a 1 becomes a random variable:
As a result, the initial wealth w 0 also becomes risky:w
For clarity and simplicity of our analysis, we can rewrite this relationship as
~0
w w ε = + where ε is a mean preserving spread parameter such that ( ) 0 E ε = .
The assumption that an environmental risk would cause a risk to the initial wealth via a particular environment condition related to a particular asset is critical for the analysis as it will be clear later. This assumption would not be so strong and unrealistic since our daily life experiences such relationship between an environmental condition and the assets. For example, we want to object against constructing a factory near our home or water basement: because it brings a risk to reduce the price of our house via the negative effect on health of the residents. In this model, a decision maker faces an exogenous chance to decide how much he or she gives up among a potential payoff. If he or she wins, then he or she takes the difference between the maximum potential payoff and the giving-up amount, and gets nothing otherwise. Crucially, the giving-up amount and the winning probability has a positive relationship. So, his or her task is to decide the giving-up amount by which his or her expected utility is maximized.
We can denote his or her initial wealth by w 0 , the pre-defined maximum potential gain by z and the giving-up amount by x. Thus x∈ [0,z] , and his or her final payoff or outcome will be w 0 +z-x if he or she wins. Otherwise, his or her final payoff will be w 0 . Letting u(.) a von Neuman-Morgenstern utility function and p(.) the winning probability where p'(x)>0 and p''(x) ≤0, we can construct his or her expected utility maximization problem:
{x} where u(.) >0, u'(.) >0, and u''(.) ≤0.
2) The reason why the model is not applied to every decision making situations is explained on pp.4. That is, the effect of the background risk on a decision making in general depends on the specific decision making situations. See Pratt and Zeckhauser (1987) , Kimball (1993) , Eeckhoudt et al. (1996) , Gollier and Pratt (1996) and McGuire et al. (1991) .
Lee (2008) Solving the first order condition leads to the following relationship:
It is easy to show that our assumptions on p(x), u(.) are sufficient for the maximization problem. From (1), we can derive Lemma 1.
Lemma 1) A risk neutral person's optimized giving-up amount satisfies that
neutral person. For him or her, the following relationship always holds:
should be equal to zero to satisfy the condition. Thus,
Propositions Ⅲ Using (1) and Lemma (1), we can derive the following Proposition 1. Proposition 2 can be directly derived from Proposition 1. Proof) A risk averse person's utility function satisfies
for any nonnegative h. Let us denote his or her FOC by D(x A )=0. Consider
dD(x)/dx < 0 by the second order condition, we can find that
Proposition 2) As a risk averse person becomes more risk averse, his or her giving-up amount becomes larger. 
Note that D(x A )=0. This implies
Putting (6) into (5),
Since 
dD(x*)/dw 0 = p'(x*)•u'(w 0 +M-x*)-p(x*)•u''(w 0 +M-x)-p'(x*)•u'(w 0 ).
Now consider the problem of the more risk averse person v. Then I(x*') = p'(x*')
•v(w 0 +M-x*')-p(x*')•v'(w 0 +M-x*')-p'(x*')•v(w 0 )=-(p'(x*')•u'(w 0 +M-x*')-p(x*') •u''(w 0 +M-x*') -p'(x*') •u'(w 0 )) = 0. Since u''<0 and u'''>0, we get v'>0 and v''<0. Thus it is easy to
show that the second order condition dI/dx < 0. Moreover, recall that x*' > x* from Proposition 2. These imply I(x*)>0. Hence, we can show that I(x*) = Our final proposition suggests that an exogenous risk at the initial wealth induced by an environmental risk induce more risk averse person to give up more among potential outcomes. This does not depend on the property of p(.). Thus the proposition and its proof are identical to that suggested by Lee (2008) .
-(p'(x*)•u'(w 0 +M-x*)-p(x*)•u''(w 0 +M-x*)-p'(x*)•u'(w 0 ))= -dD(x*)/dw
Proposition 4) Lee (2008) Suppose that an environmental risk induce a mean-zero independent background risk at initial wealth w 0 , is w ε = w 0 +ε where E(ε)=0. If u'''>0 (i.e., DARA) and u''''<0 (i.e., DAP: decreasing absolute prudence) at every initial wealth level, a risk averse subject whose initial wealth is under the exogenous background risk will give up more than one whose initial wealth does not have any risk. That is, x ε > x A for every wealth level where x ε denotes the optimal x under the background risk and x A denotes the optimal x in the case that there is no background risk.
Proof) See Lee (2008) .
An illustration of Propositions
Ⅳ
For an illustration of our propositions, consider a risk averse unemployed person whose preference follows DARA and DAP. 3) Suppose that he or she has a house as an asset and searches for a job. Now suppose that a CNG gas station is planned to be built near his or her house. Then, what is the effect of such a plan on his or her job search behaviour?
3) Note that our proposition suggests that a risk neutral person would not change his optimal decision as his or her initial wealth changes.
First, assume that it is known that the price of the house certainly falls as the direct effect of the plan. Then, it is clear that his or her wealth certainly decreases.
But is it the end of the story? Our Proposition 3 suggests that it is not. As the wealth decreases, he or she tries to give up more among potential outcomes. This implies that his or her reservation wage for taking a job would decrease. The plan affects his or her decisions related to a job.
Second, assume that the direction of the price change of the house is not certain:
it could rise due to a possible further development or fall due to a possible environmental damage. That is, building the gas station could bring a mean-zero risk at wealth. Then, our Proposition 4 suggests that this risk also changes the decision for a job. He or she would try to reduce his or her reservation wage to increase the chance for getting a job.
Implications on environmental policies Ⅴ Applications of our propositions are not restricted to an environmental policy as a referee correctly points out: those are applied to any situation or for any policy only if it meets the conditions for the chance-improving model. Thus, it would be helpful to specifically illustrate the implications of our main proposition (i.e.
Proposition 4) on an environmental policy. 4) It would be clear from Proposition 4 that if an environmental policy could remove a background environmental risk which affects a decision maker's initial wealth, the evaluation of the policy should not only account of the direct value from removing such an environmental risk but also the possible indirect values from the changes 4) We do not focus on the implications of Proposition 3 on an environmental policy in this paper. However, it is easy to find out that most environmental policies such as an emission charge and a direct regulation based on emission standards could reduce a firm's initial wealth. Thus, it would be clear that the firm would behave more risk aversely in the chance improving decision making situations if it is risk averse with DARA preference. This implies that the firm would prefer an investment project with a more probable but less payoff only if the investment project guarantees no loss at the firm's initial wealth. Suppose that the individual's reservation wage was r1 under the downside environmental risk. Proposition 3 predicts that an environmental policy removing such a risk (e.g. regulations on emission of dirty air) would increase his or her reservation wage. That is, the reservation wage under the environmental policy removing such a risk, r 2 , would be larger than r1. Second, the initial wealth could be at a mean-zero risk. For instance, the house price could be at a mean-zero risk due to the trade-off between the environmental risk and the benefit from industrialization. Then While some environmental policies can remove the background risk which exists due to an environmental risk, it is also possible that an environmental policy brings about a background risk. An environmental policy could lead to a background risk at initial wealth by two different ways. First, if an environmental policy which could affect initial wealth is planned but delayed without confirmation, it could bring about a background risk at a decision maker's initial wealth. For example, suppose that abolishing a greenbelt on an area is planned but the implementation is delayed without confirmation. At the moment when the plan is known, the price of real estates on the area would arise. Then, it could bring about a risk at initial wealth since the price of a house or a real estate would further increase if the plan is implemented but the price would fall if the plan is not implemented. In this case, our Proposition 4 suggests that the delay would affect the behaviour of a risk averse job searcher who has a real estate in the area by reducing his or her reservation wage. If a government wants to minimize this indirect effect, it should minimize the delay.
More importantly, an environmental policy itself could generate a background risk. An important example would be the emission permit trading system. A firm can participate to the emission permit market and trade the emission permits under the emission permit trading system. A firm could face a risk at initial wealth since the future price of the emission permit is in general not certain. Thus, it is possible that the emission permit trading system generates a background risk at the firm's initial wealth. Suppose that the firm initially has remaining emission permits of e with the current price of p. Then the firm's initial wealth is consequence is that the policy could affect the firm's general investment decisions which meet the conditions of the chance improving decision situations and are not directly related to the emission problem. Specifically, suppose that the firm is risk averse with DARA and DAP preferences and that it is to choose an investment project in an investment project set. Assume that any investment project in the set guarantees a non-negative net profit and the probability (q) winning the potential net profit ( π ) is negatively related to the potential net profit (i.e. q'( π )<0) and q'' ( π )<0 . These assumptions would not be too strong: that is, a low π would imply that the project would be an easy one to achieve, and the increment of the chance would become diminish as π decreases. Denote the choice set net profit π and its winning probability q. 5) ) Noting the negative relationship between π and q, suppose that the potential net profit decreases and the winning probability increases as i increases. That is, mj would be a more conservative (i.e. a more risk averse) investment project than mk if j > k. Our Proposition 4 suggests that the firm, which chooses an investment project mk when there is no price risk under the emission permit trading system, would choose a more conservative investment project mj if the price of the emission permit is at a mean preserving risk under the system. It would be easily shown that if the firm is risk neutral, its decision on the investment project is not affected by the background risk generated by the uncertainty of the price of the emission permit. Thus, if a government, which wants to implement the emission permit trading system, would need to consider a firm's risk attitude. If a firm is risk averse, then the government would also need to consider the indirect effect which could be generated by the emission permit trading system on the firm's general investment decisions. That is, the possible price uncertainty of the emission permit would change the decisions on general investment projects which seems to be irrelevant to the emission activity if the firm is risk averse with DARA and DAP preferences. In this case, the government may need to consider the way which could stabilize the price of the emission permit. If the banking system and the share system can stabilize the price of the emission permit through periods as suggested by some experimental studies (Godby et al. (1997 ), Muller (1999 ), these systems could not only improve the efficiency of the market but also prevent firms' general investment decision from changing to a conservative one in the decision making situations depicted above.
5) Note that this is just an alternative and discrete representation of the chance improving situation model.
Conclusion
Ⅵ
In this paper, we extend the results in Lee (2008) and apply those to environmental policies. We also generalize those relaxing the assumption on p(.).
The implication of this paper is simple and clear: if an environmental policy brings about the change of a person's wealth, or if it brings about the risk at the person's wealth, then his or her other economic decisions would be affected by the environmental policy in some situations. A more specific prediction is that a risk averse person whose preference follows DARA and DAP would behave more risk aversely and give up more among potential outcomes when he or she faces a simple chance improving situation such as job search decision making and decision on a particular investment project where its potential payoff is negatively related to its success probability and it guarantees a non-negative net profit.
An environmental policy could change a person's general economic decisions in some situations only if it changes an environmental condition and such a change of the environmental condition affects his or her initial wealth.
